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Introduction 
“At the centre of this attempt to re-establish the value of the classical 
experience of madness. . . there is . . . a motionless figure . . . : the simple 
division into daylight and obscurity, shadow and light, dream and waking, the 
truth of the sun and the power of midnight.  An elementary figure, which only 
accepts time as the indefinite return of a limit.”   (Michel Foucault, History of 
Madness, 1961 Preface, xxxiv)  
 
“[T]he self-relation of a limit at once erases and multiplies the limit; it cannot but 
divide it in inventing it.  The limit only comes to be effaced—it only comes to 
efface itself—as soon as it is inscribed.”  (Jacques Derrida, “’To Do Justice to 
Freud’: the History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis” 260)  
  
The “borderline”  is here first of all a twentieth-century clinical term—
psychiatric, psychological, and psychoanalytic—for a certain syndrome, state, disorder, 
or type somewhere between neurosis and psychosis.  In less narrowly clinical and 
twentieth-century terms: the “borderline” is situated between a fundamentally 
rational—perhaps all too rational—and an essentially irrational—perhaps irremediably 
irrational—mode of human being: between reason and unreason, where the latter is 
understood as madness.  The attempt to determine the status, sense, and value of the 
“borderline”  category today necessarily engages us, therefore, beyond the confines of 
clinical discourse, in a more general historical and philosophical reflection on the border 
between madness and reason.1  The most important historical point of departure for 
such a reflection offered by recent humanities work is, to my mind, clearly still Michel 
Foucault’s The History of Madness. (It was originally published in French in 1961, and has 
been available in a complete English translation only since 2006).  But in order to engage 
rigorously with the implications of this work for the limits of madness and reason, one 
needs to read it in conjunction with the methodological-philosophical critique by Jacques 
Derrida in his two essays, “Cogito and the History of Madness”  and “‘To Do Justice to 





Freud’: the History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis.”2  In addition, one does 
well to consider Foucault’s (wounded and angry but nonetheless interesting) responses 
to Derrida.  While this point of departure, the polemical exchange between (Foucault’s) 
historical discourse-analysis and (Derrida’s) philosophical deconstruction, is of 
formidable complexity, it will be useful to say a few words about it here.  For the 
exchange provides philosophical and historical concepts that are crucial, I believe, to any 
productively innovative discussion of “borderline”  disorders today, in the clinical and 
nonclinical senses of the term.  Concerning the nonclinical sense, reconsideration of the 
Foucault-Derrida exchange is important for all current humanities border theory, 
because their exchange condenses the methodological stakes of the historical passage 
from the deconstructionist moment of the 1970s-80s to the cultural studies heyday 
from the later 1980s through today.   
 Let me begin by providing a very sketchy overview of the claims and scope of 
Foucault’s fascinating, provocative, and informative work.  The central historical claim of 
Foucault’s History of Madness—whose original French title translates as Madness and 
Unreason: History of Madness in the Classical Age—is that in early modernity, the discourse 
of “reason” constitutes itself by disavowing and externalizing its essential affinities with 
“unreason,”  a disavowal realized not just in theory, of course, but in the practice of the 
modern treatments and mistreatment of the insane.  The modern mistreatments begin 
with massive isolation, according to Foucault, i.e. with the exclusion of the “mad” from 
society at large, in what Foucault calls “the great confinement” of the seventeenth 
century, the (French neo-) “classical age.”3    
While the bulk of his book focuses on the practices and theories of this period, 
Foucault provides a somewhat broader contextualization.  He begins with the closing of 
the leprosariums at the end of the Middle Ages and suggests that these were partially 
transformed into “general hospitals”  in the classical age.  The mad thus become a new 
sort of “leper” in the early modern period, endangering the body of sovereign reason in 
the Renaissance and the subsequent age of absolutism.  But the relevant danger shifts in 
this period, according to Foucault, from death to madness: “From the knowledge of that 
fatal necessity that reduces man to dust we pass to a contemptuous contemplation of 





the nothingness that is life itself ” (14).   The Renaissance explores in image and deed, 
fact and fiction, the motif of the “ship of fools,” signifying for Foucault that just prior to 
their “confinement,” the tendency was to send the mad away to the outer limits of the 
city, or to an indefinite elsewhere—a very different strategy from the subsequent, 
neoclassical strategy of exclusionary enclosure (together with the impoverished, the 
criminal, the indebted), which implied a very different notion of unreason.  Further, 
along with the physical marginalization and exportation of the insane, the Renaissance 
defends itself against the new threat of madness by splitting madness into two forms, a 
“tragic” and a “critical” form, the first primarily represented in images such as those of 
Bosch and Breughel, the second mainly in texts such as those by Erasmus and Brant.  It 
is the former “tragic” modality of madness that will be subjected to exclusionary 
“confinement”  in the “classical age.”   If the “tragic” face of madness is inassimilable to 
social mores, its “critical” face (madness as lack of wisdom, as corrigible or at least 
tolerable folly) is mobilized by Renaissance literature and philosophy to smooth the 
articulation of the modernizing individual with the absolutist state.   
Moving beyond the “classical age,” in turn, Foucault traces the displacements of 
the exclusionary confinement of the insane into the eighteenth century.  During the 
Enlightenment, the insane are gradually separated out from the other categories of 
“unreason”  (poverty, criminality, immorality).  This separation is followed by the 
“liberation” of the insane through the work of reformers such as Samuel Tuke and 
Philippe Pinel in the early nineteenth century, whose supposedly emancipatory practices 
and intentions Foucault regards with a persuasively skeptical eye.  The book concludes 
with a condensed sketch of the development of psychology and medical psychiatry 
across the nineteenth century, in connection with the establishment of the “asylums” for 
the insane.  Looking forward to a future in which reason and madness would be 
synthesized into a higher unity, Foucault juxtaposes with these clinical discourses the 
lyricism of madness in isolated figures such as Hölderlin, Novalis, and Nietzsche.  With 
more than a hint of romantic messianism, Foucault characterizes these “mad poets”  as 
re-establishing a tie with “tragic” unreason beyond the pathologizing limits of the 
modern psychological transformation of the mad into mere objects of observation.4   





To recall even thus very hastily the main traits of Foucault’s monumental history 
of the silencing of the irrational is valuable in our context.  His work reminds us here, 
despite and because of its romantic dimension, how even medically scientific and morally 
humane attempts to delimit and control madness are ineluctably entangled with ideology 
and a continuing history of power-dynamics.  Such entanglement extends, indeed, from 
the pre-modern period down to our own day, despite practitioners’ most generous 
exertions.  More narrowly with respect to our theme, Foucault helps us begin to grasp 
the particular anxiety that will necessarily be felt by those identified with “reason” or 
“social order”—in right, left, or center political variants (i.e. quasi all of “us”)—
wherever the “borderline”  between reason and madness (and so, in twentieth-century 
mental health discourses, the frontier between neurosis and psychosis) is in question.  
To be sure, helping people in trouble is not always intentionally disingenuous, but it is, 
with equal certainty, never entirely separable from the helpers’ investment in keeping 
their distance from the trouble involved.   Indeed, this is one of the good reasons why 
psychoanalytic training requires a personal analysis.  It is also a good reason why 
psychoanalytic discourse often discourages its practitioners from imagining that they are 
“helping” their analysands—or getting rid of their symptoms.  Nonetheless, because 
Foucault’s important perspective on the history of madness is marked by certain 
“limitations”  of its own, which Derrida usefully brings out, we need to reconstruct 
Foucault’s debate with Derrida before proceeding to the essays in this section.  
 Derrida was by no means apolitical or indifferent to history.  But as a 
professional philosopher and a critical, detailed reader of the phenomenological and 
structuralist traditions (as well as the history of philosophy more generally), he was 
obviously above all concerned in his writings with what he termed “logophonocentric 
metaphysics” in the Western philosophical tradition, rather than with the concrete 
particulars of social and institutional historiography.  This more abstract focus is 
precisely what enabled him to have an exacerbated awareness of methodological and 
philosophico-historical problems in Foucault’s discourse, even if it may have limited 
Derrida’s capacity to appreciate some of the descriptive details of Foucault’s historical 
writings.  In accordance with Derrida’s interest in the dismantling of binary philosophical 





conceptualities, the general thrust of his response to Foucault is to complicate and 
disturb the linear temporality of Foucault’s historiography, while Derrida nonetheless 
shares Foucault’s intense interest in grasping and allowing for what reason always leaves 
out or effaces.   
In his first article on Foucault, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Derrida 
unsettles this linear temporality by questioning whether the “classical age” differentiates 
itself as radically or significantly as Foucault claims from those that precede it and 
proceed upon it.  For example, Derrida reminds his reader not only that a discourse of 
reason was already being constituted in ancient Greece (raising questions about 
Foucault’s hasty mention of Greek hybris, Socrates’ stance, etc.), but that the circulation 
of madness in the Middle Ages was not as free as Foucault makes it seem, that the 
marginalization of the mad in the Renaissance was not without its own forms of 
containment, and so on (“Cogito” 39ff).  That is, Derrida does not contest the 
descriptive specifics of Foucault’s discussion so much as Foucault’s exaggerated claims 
for the significance of the difference between the “classical age”  and the others—
ancient, medieval, and Renaissance—that precede it and haunt it, as well as those it 
subsequently haunts in its turn.   
The debate does not concern, therefore, the general question about whether or 
not history is important, despite the fact that in his response Foucault accuses Derrida 
of maintaining the traditional philosopher’s sublime indifference to history, an accusation 
that New Historicist Cultural Studies will subsequently tend to repeat ad nauseam with 
respect to post-structuralism in general (“ My Body, this Paper, this Fire,” in Madness 
562-74). Nor does the debate concern, on the other hand, principally a particular point 
about neoclassicism or Descartes within the history of madness, as it might seem to do 
because Derrida focuses in part on a critique of Foucault’s reading of Descartes.  
Rather, Derrida’s focus is on a question about how to understand the temporality of 
history; his concern is the madness and methods of historiography as the writing of 
events and the event of writing. 
The difference between Foucault and Derrida on this point, however, turns out 
to hinge on a difference between their views on limits and borders in general.  Thus, 





where Foucault writes a history of radical discontinuities or differences, Derrida insists 
here and in his subsequent article on Foucault (to which we return in a moment) that 
some continuities or samenesses are being neglected.  Where Foucault sees limits or 
borders that are impenetrable, Derrida sees (in Foucault’s historical-epochal 
determinations) more porous surfaces, the mutual interference of periods.  The 
discourse-analyst emphasizes the real, historical violence of the borders imposed; the 
deconstructionist emphasizes the vanity of this violence as evidenced, through 
philosophical interpretation, in the immediately virtual and ultimately effectual collapse of 
the borders.  There is thus between Foucault and Derrida a difference in emphasis in the 
interpretation of borders, which does not prevent a significant sharing of concerns and 
perspectives. 
 As a consequence of this different general emphasis, Derrida argues against 
Foucault that the exclusion of madness by reason in the “classical age” is not only not 
the “exclusive”  privilege of that age, so to speak, but also excludes itself from itself.  
Reason confines and unconfines itself, as well as madness.  How does Derrida argue 
this ?  Derrida’s synecdochic demonstration of the role of unreason within reason itself 
focuses critically in “Cogito and the History of Madness” on Foucault’s mobilization of 
Descartes as an exemplary instance of the exclusion of madness from reason in the 
“classical age.” While the details of this struggle over Descartes’ legacy—which persists 
in Lacan as we will see below—need not detain us, I will retain here three general traits.   
First, Derrida argues against Foucault that, specifically through the role of the 
“evil genius,” Descartes does not simply exclude madness from consideration, but 
allows it to play a larger and more essential role in his philosophical discourse than 
Foucault acknowledges (“Cogito”  52).  Secondly, and on the other hand, Derrida grants 
that the Cartesian subject ultimately does push aside the possibility of its own madness, 
but indicates that reason assures itself more through an appeal to faith than through its 
own operations (58).  Third, however, this gesture is for Derrida not specific to the 
“classical age” but endemic to all discourse as such, even ostensibly nontheologically 
grounded discourse.  All operations of making sense whatsoever distance themselves 
from senselessness (“Cogito” 59-60 passim).  And such operations of course include 





Foucault’s own attempt to make sense of the silencing of unreason in his work on the 
History of Madness, precisely a work from which madness, as what he calls the “absence 
of the work” (in a phrase that Derrida repeatedly and without irony calls profound), is 
necessarily and in principle excluded (“Cogito” 53-4, et passim).  In short, Derrida shares 
with Foucault an abiding concern with the violent exclusion of madness, of the irrational, 
of the senseless—of what both Foucault and he call “negativity”  (“Cogito” 41 and 
308n4; Madness 251)—but he questions Foucault’s periodizing zeal because it makes, as 
it were, too much sense out of the effacement of the senseless.  Instead, Derrida argues 
for a more complex temporality of history, whereby different epochs are understood to 
anticipate and retroactively affect each other constitutively: a linear narrative, even one 
like Foucault’s, marked by sharp cuts and discontinuities, is no longer cleanly possible.    
 But what are the implications for psychoanalysis of this debate between the linear 
historiography and the deconstruction of the polarity opposing madness to reason?   
Since psychoanalysis questions linear history in its own domain through the notions of 
repetition and retroactive meaningfulness, while it also sometimes allies itself with 
repressive, ideological discourses of rationality and conformist talk of reality-values, this 
is a complex question.  It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that when Foucault 
considers the twentieth century at the far end of his trajectory in the History of Madness 
he mentions Freud intermittently in terms that vacillate wildly between two extremes.  
At one moment, he credits Freud for having reestablished a dialogue between reason 
and unreason after the end of the classical “confinement” of the insane (and against the 
nineteenth-century perpetuation of this “confinement” in the name of emancipatory 
reform).  At the next moment, he discredits Freud for having perfected, through the 
invention of the “analytic situation,” a more subtle form of confinement within an 
asylum, subjugating the patient (qua passive object) to the quasi-thaumaturgical authority 
of the now medicalized magician.  But how exactly is one to account for Foucault’s 
striking ambivalence or uncertainty with respect to Freud’s contribution and the status 
of psychoanalysis in general?  
Derrida traces and interprets these vacillations in detail in “‘To Do Justice To 
Freud’: the History of Madness in the Age of Psychoanalysis,” written some years after 





Foucault’s early death.  Derrida explains this unresolved problem in Foucault by 
attributing it to Foucault’s inadequate grasp of the undecidability of limits and borders, 
both in general and in the specific Freudian manifestation and theorization of this 
undecidability.  Not only are the borders of periods, discourses, and authors’ œuvres 
rough-edged, and not only is the subjective or objective status of knowledge uncertain, 
at least in the interpretive fields (such that one cannot simply decide the question of 
whether Foucault is just ambivalent or Freud is himself ambiguous).  In addition, 
according to Derrida, Freud articulates explicitly a theoretical motif that inscribes 
irrationality in reason (and vice versa), a theoretical figure of undecidability: nothing less 
than the dual principle of libido, eros-thanatos.  As the mutual entanglement but 
continuing opposition of productive and destructive behavior, or more abstractly the 
principles of unity (or identity) and multiplicity (or difference), eros and thanatos—like 
language itself—divide the subject at all points against itself.  They thus impose upon it a 
regime of what Derrida elsewhere calls “life-death” or “survivance”: one lives by 
constantly outliving oneself.5  Under such a regime, the unification of reason with itself, 
its differentiation from its other, will always be shadowed—doubled in a displaced 
manner—by the disunification of reason, the inscription of its other within itself.  Yet as 
Derrida points out, Foucault essentially ignores the text in which Freud develops this 
complex thought of the death-drive, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which is an extremely 
important aspect of the psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of the borders 
or limits between reason and unreason (or ego and unconscious).   Further, Derrida 
argues that, while ignoring this aspect of Freud (or at least trying to), Foucault not only 
plays an extended fort-da game with Freud himself (casting Freud alternately inside and 
outside the limits of the group of modernists who risk an encounter with unreason), but 
ends up, in his later writings on the History of Sexuality, articulating a position on the 
relationship between power and sexuality that is (unwittingly) reminiscent of precisely 
Freud’s articulation of this eros-thanatos relationship.6   For Derrida, psychoanalysis—
although and because it is a radically heterogeneous phenomenon—questions both 
linear historiography and the rigid opposition between reason and madness that 
Foucault retraces and bemoans.  





So where does the Foucault-Derrida debate leave psychoanalysis with respect to 
other discourses, in its relationship to the madness/reason dividing line?  As we have 
seen, the debate between Foucault and Derrida on the relations between madness and 
reason concerns the question of how to understand limits in general and the specific 
temporality of history (the limits of presence).   The differences between Foucault and 
Derrida on these questions, however, ultimately give rise to a (false) polemic that 
concerns the question of whether history or philosophy is the more appropriate discipline 
through which to study what reason in its broadest sense tends to suppress and avoid.  
Indeed, when Foucault responds to Derrida’s first essay (the only one of the two that 
was written or published during Foucault’s lifetime) in “My Body, this Paper, this Fire,” 
he does not just contest Derrida’s critique of his reading of Descartes in the History of 
Madness. On the basis of this contestation, he accuses Derrida of being complicitous in 
the culpable subjugation of madness by continuing to adhere to a traditional model of 
philosophy.  In turn, Derrida had indeed argued that a certain kind of linear 
historiography itself belonged to such a traditional model, a point Foucault wants to 
deny.  Thus, while it is not precisely the case (if we take Derrida somewhat seriously, as 
I think we should) that the debate ends up with the alternative between philosophy and 
history as the potential liberator of madness (and of everything “confined” as 
“unreason”  in the classical age), the appearance of this alternative is one de facto 
ideological or caricatural result of the debate, and a result that has colored much 
humanities work ever since.  Is philosophy (perhaps as “theory”) the discourse that is 
privileged to grasp the irrational underside of its own figures of thought, or does history 
have priority, in that it graphs subjection in its arbitrary violence, power-dynamics, and 
so on?  Is (deconstructive) philosophy situated on the borderline of reason, either in the 
“good” sense (that it maintains contact with—especially its own—unreason) or in the 
“bad sense” (that it polices the border of rationality to keep error out)?  Or is history 
on this border, again either in the “good” sense (that it reaches to the edge of unreason 
by describing its exclusion and by renouncing the formal self-reflexivity of philosophy 
that tends toward the policing of thought) or in the “bad”  sense (that it precisely 
“makes sense” of that which exceeds “sense”  in the sense of supersensuous meaning)?   





Is philosophy irrational, untrue, and/or dishonest, and hence mad in a negative sense 
when it claims to grasp or to participate in madness?   Is history irrational when it makes 
the same claims?7  Is psychoanalysis more akin to a historiography of the subject or to a 
philosophical-ethical discourse?  
Instead of pursuing these questions in our own terms, let us look now into the 
ways in which the contributions in this section position themselves (and psychoanalysis) 
with respect to these potential alternative views of the best approach to the borderline 
of reason and madness.    
 
*          *          * 
 
 The first essay in this Special Issue, like the last, approaches our topic from 
outside the edges of psychoanalysis, providing us with a glimpse into the history of 
narcissism a century before the invention of psychoanalysis.  Outside any explicit 
engagement with either Foucault or Derrida, but closer to the former than the latter, 
Alexander Mathäs’ “Keeping Narcissism at Bay: Kant and Schiller on the Sublime,” 
provides a version of the historicist-materialist critique of idealist philosophical 
pretensions.  Mathäs argues that the aesthetics of the sublime, which lays claim to a 
philosophical transcendence of the narcissistic, or imaginary-sensuous self, in fact falls 
prey to the narcissism that it claims to exceed.  His argument aligns loosely with that of 
Foucault on madness, in that the object of Mathäs’ critique is likewise a version of the 
neoclassical attempt to master the irrational, this time in the German Enlightenment and 
Neoclassical thought of Kant and Schiller, and more specifically in their neoclassical 
aesthetics.  In the eighteenth century, alongside such terms as “enthusiasm” and 
“Schwärmerei,” “narcissism”  already functions as a figure for a morally culpable madness, 
as an irrational entrapment in the senses.  By retracing this functioning in Kant and 
Schiller, Mathäs’ piece provides a useful glance into the historical origins of the discourse 
on narcissism a century prior to its clinical (re)inscription by P. Näcke and Havelock 
Ellis.  This discourse on narcissism is at the very center of the concerns in the current 
Special Issue, for it extends through Sigmund Freud up to figures like Heinz Kohut and 





Otto Kernberg, in whose important works the difficult distinction between narcissistic 
and “borderline”  personality disorders is still under contention, as well as into Lacan, 
who has little or no interest in the “borderline” personality category per se, as we will 
see in the third section of this Issue below.    
 In contrast to Mathäs (but not binary opposition), the essay by Samuel Weber in 
this first section, “Anxiety: the Uncanny Borderline of Psychoanalysis,” places itself in 
the (non)philosophical (non)tradition of deconstruction.  Focusing on Freud’s various 
attempts to theorize anxiety—from the earliest essays up to “The Uncanny” and the 
period beyond Beyond the Pleasure Principle—Weber situates (or rather unsituates) 
anxiety as the unmasterable border of both psychoanalysis and the psyche.  In the 
process, he gives Freud credit for exposing the unmasterability of anxiety, while he 
nonetheless acknowledges that this exposition occurs, in part, against Freud’s own will 
or intentions.   As the frayed (or afraid) edge of both psychoanalytic discourse and the 
individual psyche, anxiety is to affective categories what the “borderline” personality is 
to nosological ones: it is the involution of the exterior edge and the exfoliation of an 
interior folly, or foil, or fold.  Anxiety is, for Weber here, the limit where the 
psychoanalytic ego and the ego of psychoanalysis (the coherent self of psychoanalytic 
discourse), break down and cease to be able to exclude the incoherence and otherness 
that Foucault called madness itself.  
 Juliet Flower MacCannell’s piece, “Drawing Lines: from Kernberg and Haraway 
to Lacan and Beyond,” takes up a position perhaps midway between these two, in the 
sense that she stresses the importance of a historical and sociological critique of 
psychiatric discourse but also proposes a positive interpretation of the contributions of 
(Freudian, then Lacanian) psychoanalysis in this regard, and ends up underlining the 
importance of a notion of the trait that seems marked by the Derridian reflection on 
writing.  MacCannell begins with a critical analysis of Kernberg’s concept of the 
“borderline”  (which I outline below in the Introduction to the third section of this 
Issue), a critical analysis that questions the ideological commitments entailed by 
Kernberg’s institutional-disciplinary position, as well as his presupposed metaphysics.  
Specifically, she invokes Erving Goffman’s sociological critique of both medical psychiatry 





and cognitive-behavioral psychology against Kernberg’s ego-psychological/object-
relations approach, questioning the apolitical and ahistorical character of the latter’s 
theory, and indicting in Lacanian (and implicitly also Foucauldian) terms the social 
conformism of its emphasis on the strong ego.   Of course, MacCannell knows well that 
the acting-out and suffering of the “borderlines”  (and others) among us is neither a 
mere fantasy of the heavy-handed psychiatrist qua extension of the police apparatus, nor 
a mere political strategy of disruption on the part of a sovereign rebellious or 
revolutionary subject.  Hence, she argues in the remainder of her essay—via readings of 
Freud, Rousseau, Lacan, and Haraway—that, on the one hand, dividing lines are 
necessary, but that, on the other hand, there is a difference between drawing a line to 
mark the opening of a difference and drawing a line to establish a container and to 
control its contents.   MacCannell closes urging us to focus on the former, the drawing 
of lines as a writing or sketching that opens up a displacement of differences.  






                                                      
1   While contemporary clinical discourses will often downplay the origins of the 
 “borderline” concept, declaring that “we now know that the borderline is its own 
specific phenomenon, and has nothing to do with a limit between neurosis and 
psychosis,” a minimal sense of history makes it obvious that this sort of dismissal or 
disavowal must be regarded with a skeptical eye. 
2   Of course, ultimately any thorough reception of Foucault has to deal also with his 
historian critics, by comparison with whom he appears perhaps more Cartesian, more 
of a traditional philosopher than he might intend.  Cf. Midelfort 7-9, 229f ; and Scull 13-
20 passim.   
3   Psychiatric hospitalization of the “borderline” is evidently light years away from the 
seventeenth-century incarceration of “unreason,” although there remain, of course, 
social order concerns that link contemporary clinical and penal discourses with those of 
previous epochs.  For the state of the art proposal of partial hospitalization of 
“borderlines,” see the studies by Bateman and Fonagy.     
4   More specifically, this romanticism—which should prompt us (only) partially to 
skepticism—is closely akin to, and of course strongly influenced by, the late romanticism 
of the early Nietzsche, whose Wagnerian Birth of Tragedy still plays an important 
structuring role in Foucault’s early argument.   The splitting of the understanding of 
madness into a “tragic” and a “critical” understanding—which Foucault situates in the 
Renaissance, and which precedes the externalization of the “tragic” form of madness 
through the “confinement” invented by the “classical age”—bears a close resemblance 
to the splitting of ancient Greek culture, on Nietzsche’s account in the Birth of Tragedy, 
into an increasingly buried Dionysian culture and a philosophical, Socratic, “critical” 
culture (broached in the theoreticist, watered-down tragedies of Euripides).   As 
Nietzsche heralded the rebirth of tragedy in his mentor, Wagner, and later the 
overcoming of “man” in the Übermensch, so Foucault ends up, in the History of Madness, 
with the insane poets from Hölderlin to Artaud, who announce precisely a rebirth of 
the tragedy of madness and the end of (rational) “man,” in a schema that moreover still 
participates in Christian apocalyptic rhetoric, as Derrida points out in the essay “To Do 
Justice to Freud,” which I discuss below.    
5   See “To Speculate—on Freud” (The Post-Card 257-410).   
6   By “trying to,” I refer to Derrida’s discussion of the places where Foucault credits 
Freud with inventing an analytics of finitude, but never mentions Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle or the “death drive” as such (252-60).   
7   Derrida in fact answered this last question affirmatively with respect to Foucault, and 
in this sense praised Foucault in the very movement of criticizing his claim to grasp 
madness in an unmediated manner (“Cogito” 34).  
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